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SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE IN THE TRENCHES: THE
CASE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
JOHN BERNARD CORR*

[When] the Supreme Court renders an opinion, everybody gets
in line.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Well, maybe; but notwithstanding Reynolds' confidence in the
efficacy of the High Court, lower courts that are willing and anxious to "get in line" are not always able to do so. Gaps occur between aspirations and performance. In the descent from the Olympus of the Supreme Court to the boiler room of the lower courts, a
picture of judicial doctrine emerges that differs from the antiseptic
abstractions which comprise so much doctrinal analysis. These
gaps often stem from judicial doctrine that is just and logical in
the abstract but difficult to apply in concrete situations. How well
a doctrine actually will operate, therefore, should be a central consideration when the Supreme Court develops new law.
This Article uses the recently declared Supreme Court doctrine
of nonmutual collateral estoppel to examine how the development
of judicial doctrine might be altered to account for problems of
application in the lower courts. The study focuses on collateral estoppel as a case study from which general principles of doctrinal
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and

Mary. A.B., 1963, A.M., 1964, John Carroll University; Ph.D., 1971, Kent State University;
J.D., 1978, Georgetown University.
I am grateful to my colleagues, Frederick F. Schauer and Robert C. Palmer, for their
encouragement and their thoughtful criticisms of an earlier draft of this article. I also am
indebted to my former research assistant, Kenneth H. Boone, who had the tedious but important job of locating the large number of federal court decisions upon which this article is
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1. Washington Post, June 14, 1984, at A10, col. 3 (quoting William Bradford Reynolds,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice).
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development may be drawn rather than examining possible improvements in the doctrine itself. The technique for this analysis
involves several steps. First, the Article lays out the doctrine of
nonmutual collateral estoppel as it has evolved through Supreme
Court decisions. Next, the Article compares lower court application
of nonmutual collateral estoppel with the doctrinal principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court. The Article then contrasts the
relatively successful operation of nonmutual collateral estoppel
with the less successful application of another recent Supreme
Court doctrine, retroactivity, which a previous Article examined in
depth. 2 Finally, the Article identifies the general principles of doctrinal analysis which can be gleaned by examining and comparing
the two doctrines.
Nonmutual collateral estoppel is part of a larger group of rules
which, for purposes of this Article, may be referred to collectively
as "finality doctrine." Finality doctrine is composed of two major
parts: res judicata, which prevents parties and their privies from
relitigating claims or causes of action previously reduced to final
judgment; 3 and collateral estoppel, which precludes relitigation of
issues necessarily decided in a prior suit, even if the causes of action in the suits are not identical.4 Nonmutual collateral estoppel is
a relatively recent addition to the federal rules of collateral estoppel. Before 1971, the federal courts generally recognized the principle of mutuality. 5 Under this doctrine, according to a recent Supreme Court description, "neither party could use a prior
judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were
bound by the judgment." 6 In 1971, however, the Court rejected the
2. See Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied", 61 N.C.L.
REv. 745 (1983). For a definition of retroactivity, see id. at 745-46. See also infra notes 20320 and accompanying text for a discussion of retroactivity doctrine.
3. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). The term "res judicata" commonly
"incorporate[s] both true res judicata and collateral estoppel." White v. World Fin. of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147, 150 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981). To avoid confusion, however, this Article
will use res judicata only to describe the doctrine governing when claims or causes of action
may not be relitigated. Finality doctrine will be used as the umbrella term for both res
judicata and collateral estoppel.
4. Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897).
5. There were, however, a few prominent exceptions to the general practice of requiring
mutuality of estoppel. See, e.g., Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.
1950) ("[No unfairness results here from estoppel which is not mutual.").
6. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979).
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mutuality requirement and embraced the more liberal doctrine of
nonmutual collateral estoppel. Under the new rule, federal courts
have the discretion to apply collateral estoppel if the issue was liti7
gated fully and fairly in the first action, regardless of mutuality.
Nonmutual collateral estoppel was chosen for analysis because:
(1) it is a doctrine of fairly recent origin in the federal courts, demonstrating a clear break with the past, but old enough that evidence of its application in lower courts is now available; (2) it is
almost entirely judge-made doctrine, substantially free of constitutional and statutory constraints; and (3) it is an abandonment of a
previous hard-and-fast rule, affording lower courts little discretion,
in favor of a case-by-case analysis, providing lower courts with substantial discretion. The third element is particularly significant,
because it represents an approach to doctrinal development that
nonmutual collateral estoppel shares with retroactivity, the doctrine this Article compares with nonmutual estoppel8
II. THE

SUPREME COURT:

1971-84

A. Blonder-Tongue: The Advent of the Rule of Nonmutuality
The Supreme Court first departed from the requirement of mutuality in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,9 a patent case.10 In prior litigation involving an
unrelated defendant, the plaintiff foundation had prosecuted a
patent infringement suit unsuccessfully. In that case, the plaintiff
lost because the court concluded that the patent in question was
invalid. In Blonder-Tongue, the validity of the same patent was at
issue, but under the established rule of mutuality a change in defendants meant that the foundation could not be estopped from
relitigating the patent's validity. In fact, the rule of mutuality was
established so firmly that the defendant in Blonder-Tongue did
7. Id. at 328.
8. See supra note 2. Retroactivity also possesses the first two traits. Even if retroactivity
and collateral estoppel did not share any of these characteristics, however, comparison of
the doctrines still would be feasible.
9. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
10. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 21 (1980) ("This Court first applied the
doctrine [of nonmutual collateral estoppel] in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.").
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not even raise the collateral estoppel defense until the Supreme
Court asked both parties to argue the issue."
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White described the
thirty-year process during which many courts, including some
lower federal courts, had eroded or rejected outright the mutuality
requirement which was once so central to collateral estoppel. 12 Duplicative litigation and the accompanying misallocation of litigants'
resources had inspired this judicial evolution.' 3 In patent law, the
mutuality rule had produced these problems in unusual abundance, 4 making it a particularly appropriate vehicle for termination of the mutuality requirement.
The Court ruled that collateral estoppel could apply to patent
cases when the party against whom estoppel was sought previously
had enjoyed "a full and fair opportunity to litigate," without regard for mutuality between the parties.' 5 Justice White acknowledged that the "fairness" determination would require a factual
examination in every case, but he presented some general considerations to guide that investigation. Limiting its holding to patent
situations involving "defensive" collateral estoppel, 6 the Court

11. 402 U.S. at 317-20. But cf. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950)
(giving res judicata effect to prior finding of no negligence in spite of lack of privity between
United States and prior defendants).
12. 402 U.S. at 325-26.
13. Id. at 328-29.
14. Id. at 334-49. According to the Supreme Court, mutuality requirements produced especially acute problems in the area of patent law for two reasons. First, patent holders often
brought allegations of infringement against small businesses. This maneuver placed the burden of establishing the invalidity of the patent upon the small businesses. Patent litigation
is particularly expensive, so these businesses had a strong incentive to settle by purchasing
rights to a patent, even when they had no confidence in the validity of the patent. Such
settlements increased operational costs and disadvantaged small businesses in relation to
larger competitors with the time and financial resources to contest effectively the validity of
a patent. Second, patent cases typically absorb an inordinate amount of judicial time and
energy. The Court believed that eliminating the mutuality requirement would result in either a more frequent application of collateral estoppel or a decline in the number of dubious
patent suits filed, or both. Id.
15. Id. at 329.
16. Id. at 332. Nonmutual collateral estoppel comes in two varieties. The type at issue in
Blonder-Tongue was "defensive" collateral estoppel, in which a plaintiff is estopped from
proving an issue the plaintiff litigated and lost against another party in an earlier proceeding. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979). The other type is "offensive" collateral estoppel, in which "a litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment. ..

1985]

SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE IN THE TRENCHES

suggested that usually no unfairness would result from the invocation of estoppel against a plaintiff who had chosen the forum in
the first action, who had incentive to litigate fully in the original
case, and who had faced no procedural difficulties. In patent
cases, lower courts also might consider whether the first judicial
determination of a patent's validity employed the proper legal
standards, and whether the first court fully grasped the technical
questions in the case."' Notwithstanding these considerations, the
Court emphasized that the decision rested ultimately in the discretion of the judge. "[A]s so often is the case," the Court said, "no
one set of facts, no one collection of words or phrases, will provide
an automatic formula for proper rulings on estoppel pleas. In the
end, [the] decision will necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense of
justice and equity."' 9 Justice White apparently believed that a
grant of discretion to lower courts would improve judicial quality.
He noted that the decline in mutuality had been accompanied by
"a corresponding development of the lower courts' ability and facility in dealing with questions of when it is appropriate and fair to
impose an estoppel against a party who has already litigated an
'20
issue once and lost.
Blonder-Tongue scrupulously avoided the questions of whether
nonmutuality applies to "offensive" collateral estoppel, and
whether estoppel can be applied in a civil case to preclude relitigation of an issue decided in a prior criminal judgment." In fact, if
the Court's holding is read very narrowly, it could be interpreted
as lifting mutuality requirements only for cases involving "a plea
of estoppel by one facing a charge of infringement of a patent that
has once been declared invalid. ' 2 Blonder-Tongue represented
High Court approval of nonmutuality, but only with substantial
circumspection.

nevertheless [seeks to] use that judgment 'offensively' to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding." Id. at 326.
17. Id. at 332.
18. Id. at 333.
19. Id. at 333-34.
20. Id. at 349.
21. Id. at 327, 330.
22. Id. at 350.
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B. Parklane: Extending the Scope of Nonmutuality
After Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court did not return to the
mutuality issue until the 1978 Term. When it did, however, the
result was anything but conservative. If Blonder-Tongue was the
harbinger of change, ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore23 was the locus
of that change. The plaintiff in Parkiane,Shore, sued on behalf of
a class of the company's shareholders, alleging that a proxy statement issued by the company's officers and directors was materially
false and misleading. Shore sought damages and costs. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued the same defendants, alleging the same wrong but seeking equitable relief. The Commission's case was decided first, and
the court in that case found that the proxy statement indeed was
materially false and misleading. When Shore sought to estop the
defendants from denying that finding in his class action, two major
questions arose: (1) whether the holding of Blonder-Tongue was
limited to patent cases; and (2) whether the rule in BlonderTongue, developed in the context of defensive collateral estoppel,
applied equally to offensive collateral estoppel.
Blonder-Tongue had been most circumspect about how far
nonmutuality would reach beyond patent cases.24 Writing for the
majority in Parklane,Justice Stewart acknowledged that BlonderTongue was a patent case,2 ' but he also noted that the case addressed the "broader question" of whether it was fair to permit a
26
party to litigate an issue previously decided against that party.
The High Court thus found some precedential mandate to impose
nonmutuality beyond patent cases.
The Supreme Court appreciated the possibility that offensive
collateral estoppel might raise considerations not present in defensive collateral estoppel, and that the Blonder-Tongue "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" test might not be complete when it was
23. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
24. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
25. 439 U.S. at 327-28.

26. Id. at 328. One year after Parklane,the Court returned to a narrower characterization
of Blonder-Tongue. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 21 (1980) (In BlonderTongue "we held that a determination of patent invalidity in a prior infringement action
was entitled to preclusive effect against the patentee in subsequent litigation against a different defendant.").
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applied to offensive collateral estoppel. More specifically, the
Court recognized that offensive estoppel might offer a potential litigant an incentive not to intervene in the first action. By staying
out, a non-intervenor could ensure that an unfavorable judgment
would not bind him, but if the issues were decided favorably, he
still could obtain the benefit of collateral estoppel. As a result, two
lawsuits would be filed when one would have been sufficient. In
addition, the Court noted that offensive collateral estoppel carries
the special risk of injustice for a defendant who did not contest the
first action vigorously because it did not involve large stakes or because he did not foresee the consequences of estoppel in subse7
quent cases.1
The Court in Parklane also raised concerns about nonmutual
collateral estoppel in general. The Court noted that either form of
nonmutual collateral estoppel could preclude relitigation of an issue that had been decided inconsistently in two prior decisions.
Moreover, the majority expressed concern that the application of
nonmutual collateral estoppel could be unjust if the second action
"affords the [litigant] procedural opportunities unavailable in the
first action that could readily cause a different result." 2
The Court concluded, however, that these problems were surmountable. According to the majority, "broad discretion" for trial
judges represented the most equitable approach to nonmutual collateral estoppel.2 9 In short, the Supreme Court held that, under
this discretionary approach, nonmutual collateral estoppel might
be appropriate in both offensive and defensive contexts.3 0
Applying its new rule, the Court articulated four considerations
relevant to the reasonableness of estopping the Parklane defendants from denying that the proxy statement was materially false
and misleading. First, the class "probably could not have joined in

27. 439 U.S. at 330. Blonder-Tongue also mentioned that collateral estoppel should not
be applied unless the litigant opposing estoppel had substantial incentive to litigate in the
first action. 402 U.S. at 332-33. In Parklane,however, the Court noted that in defensive
collateral estoppel the "incentive to litigate" problem usually would not arise. 439 U.S. at
329-30.
28. 439 U.S. at 331. The Court also raised the issue of procedural disadvantage in
Blonder-Tongue. 402 U.S. at 333.
29. 439 U.S. at 331.
30. Id. at 331-32.
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the injunction action."'1 Second, the seriousness of the case and

the possibility of subsequent claims by private parties gave the defendants substantial incentive to contest the first action. 32 Third,
the decision in the injunction action did not contradict any
previous decision.3 3 Finally, no new procedural advantages likely to
produce a different result had accrued to the defendants in the
second action.3 4 Taken together, these four factors convinced the
Court that collateral estoppel should be 3applied
to preclude reliti5
veracity.
statement's
proxy
the
of
gation
C. Nonmutuality in Other Contexts
The Supreme Court returned to the mutuality question during
the 1979 Term in Standefer v. United States.3 6 Standefer represented the Court's first consideration of the issue in the context of
criminal litigation and the first consideration of the applicability of
nonmutual collateral estoppel to a governmental litigant.3 7 In
Standefer a criminal defendant sought to estop the federal government from prosecuting him for aiding and abetting a federal official who had been accused of taking a bribe. Because the federal
official already had been acquitted of the bribery charges, the defendant argued that the government could not prosecute him for
aiding a bribe, the existence of which the government previously
had been unable to establish beyond a reasonable doubt.3 8 Writing
for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that
nonmutual collateral estoppel could be applied against the federal
government, but he did not find it appropriate in this case. Using
the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" test established in
Blonder-Tongue and Parklane,9 he argued that a criminal case
presented factors not relevant to civil actions. The Chief Justice
31. Id. at 332.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 332-33.
36. 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
37. Although collateral estoppel was invoked against the federal government in a previous
case, mutuality was not a consideration because the government was in privity with a party
to the first suit. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
38. 447 U.S. at 14.
39. See supra notes 15-20, 23-35 and accompanying text.
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reasoned that the government should not be estopped from relitigating issues previously decided in other criminal actions because
of the special rules and procedures involved, including limited discovery rights, the unavailability of directed verdicts or judgments
notwithstanding the verdict, the government's inability to appeal
adverse judgments, and the possibility that the exclusionary rule
would be applied to the first case but not to the second. All of
these considerations, according to the Court, tend to deprive the
government of a full opportunity to litigate. 40 The Court also noted
that criminal cases involve an "important ... interest in the enforcement of the criminal law," a consideration not present in civil
actions.4 This interest, Chief Justice Burger reasoned, outweighs
the advantage of economy of litigation which nonmutual collateral
estoppel could provide.4 2
The Court's discussion of the applicability of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the federal government in Standefer was significant for two reasons. First, the Court's use of the general "full
and fair opportunity to litigate" test of Blonder-Tongue and Parklane left open the possibility that application of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government still might be appropriate, at
least in civil cases. 43 On the other hand, by emphasizing that public interest considerations in litigation involving the government
could outweigh factors that usually might support application of
nonmutual collateral estoppel, the Court suggested that a refusal
to invoke nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government
could be premised on a countervailing public interest present in a
particular case.44
In the 1980 Term, the Supreme Court decided Allen v. McCurry,45 a collateral estoppel case involving federal civil rights statutes. In Allen, a defendant in a prior criminal case had sought to
suppress certain evidence because the police allegedly had

40. 447 U.S. at 22-24.
41. Id. at 24.
42. Id. at 25.
43. But see United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984); infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
44. 447 U.S. at 25.
45. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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searched the defendant's home unlawfully. At a state pretrial suppression hearing, the court had held that any evidence in plain
view was seized lawfully, and at trial the defendant had been convicted using that evidence. 4 The convict subsequently brought a
Section 1983"1 suit against the police who had seized the evidence.
The police argued that collateral estoppel applied to the state
court finding that the evidence had been taken lawfully, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
collateral estoppel principles could not preclude relitigation in a
federal civil rights suit of issues previously decided in a state
court. 48 The Supreme Court, with Justice Stewart writing for the
majority, reversed. 49 The Court held that the legislative history of
the post-Civil War civil rights statutes did not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt civil rights suits from the rules of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.5 0 Allen had great significance for
civil rights law, but it also illustrated how far collateral estoppel
had come since Blonder-Tongue. Notwithstanding the public interest caveat attached to nonmutuality in Standefer, 1 by the 1980
Term nonmutual collateral estoppel had become part of the fabric
of standard judicial doctrine.
The Court decided a case in the 1983 Term which had a more
significant impact on collateral estoppel doctrine. In United States
v. Mendoza,52 an alien seeking American citizenship attempted to
apply offensive collateral estoppel to an earlier court decision in
which similarly situated citizenship applicants had successfully
challenged the government's denial of their citizenship petitions on
constitutional grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the application of collateral estoppel, characterizing ParkIane as having "sounded the death knell to [sic] the

46. Id. at 92.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
48. 606 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979).
49. 449 U.S. at 105.
50. Id. at 99-105.
51. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
52. 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
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common law doctrine of mutuality of parties. 5' 3 Noting the government's strong incentive to litigate the first case fully and the
failure of the government to appeal the adverse decision, the Ninth
Circuit pointed out that "[i]t is by now well settled . . . that collateral estoppel may be invoked against the government." 54 The
appellate court was alert-to the Supreme Court's caveat that application of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government
still was special,5 5 but concluded that the government simply had

failed to identify a" 'critical' need for redetermination of the [relevant constitutional] rights."5 6

The Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, it abandoned the discretionary approach of Blonder-Tongue and Parklane and established a non-discretionary rule for collateral estoppel litigation involving the government. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Rehnquist rejected the Ninth Circuit's characterization of Parklane as heralding the "death" of mutuality requirements, 57 claim-

ing instead that the Court had only "conditionally approved" the
5 8 Perhaps the High
offensive use of collateral estoppel in Parklane.
Court had become somewhat less hostile to mutuality
requirements.
In any event, Mendoza was most significant because of the
Court's decision to bar the general use of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. Citing Standefer v. United
53. Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320, 1325 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
568 (1984).
54. Id. at 1329.
55. Id. The Ninth Circuit cited Montana v. United States, 405 U.S. 147 (1979), but a
citation of Standefer v. United States, 440 U.S. 10 (1980), would have been more appropriate. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
56. 672 F.2d at 1329.
57. Id. at 1325 n.6.
58. 104 S. Ct. at 571. Justice Rehnquist continued to describe Blonder-Tongue as "abandoning the requirement of mutuality of parties," id., but he repeated his description of
Parklane as "conditionally approving the 'offensive' use of collateral estoppel by a nonparty to a prior lawsuit." Id. at 572.
Justice Rehnquist's statement is intriguingly contrary to his decision in Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) (approving the application of res judicata against the government despite mutuality questions). In that case, Justice Rehnquist stated that "mutuality
has been for the most part abandoned in cases involving collateral estoppel," and cited
Parklane and Blonder-Tongue. Id. at 143.
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States,59 Justice Rehnquist explained that suits involving the government typically were different from suits involving only private
parties.6 0 According to the Court, such suits often involve issues of
national importance that transcend the consequences attendant to
most private litigation.6 1 Because the government often is the only
party against whom such important suits can be brought, a decision adverse to the government in the first action might foreclose
continuing legal analysis of an issue of national consequence if
offensive collateral estoppel were invoked successfully in subsequent suits.6 2 This phenomenon would force both the government
and the Supreme Court to revise current appellate practices. When
deciding whether to appeal, the Solicitor General would have to
reduce institutional concern for limited government resources and
crowded dockets and worry much more about the binding effect of
prior decisions.6 3 The Supreme Court would have to grant government petitions for certiorari more routinely, lest the government
64
be pinned by collateral estoppel.
The heart of the Mendoza holding was that lower courts should
not even consider whether there was a national interest in particular governmental litigation. 5 Instead, the Court held simply that
the use of offensive collateral estoppel against the government generally would not be countenanced.6 6 According to Justice
Rehnquist:
The Court of Appeals did not make clear what sort of "record
evidence" would have satisfied it that there was a "crucial need"
for determination of the question in this case, but we pretermit
further discussion of that approach; we believe that the standard announced by the Court of Appeals for determining when
relitigation of a legal issue is to be permitted is so wholly subjective that it affords no guidance to the courts or to the government. Such a standard leaves the government at sea because it

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

447 U.S. 10 (1980); see supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 574.
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cannot possibly anticipate, in determining whether or not to appeal an adverse decision, whether a court will bar relitigation of
the issue in a later case. By the time a court makes its subjective
determination that an issue cannot be relitigated, the government's appeal of the prior ruling of course would be untimely.
We hold, therefore, that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel simply does not apply against the government in such a way
as to preclude
relitigation of issues such as those involved in this
7
6

case.

Mendoza, therefore, stripped the lower courts of discretion in determining when a suit involving the government contained an issue
of sufficient national importance to bar application of collateral estoppel against the government.
Midway through the 1984 Term, the Supreme Court's doctrine
on nonmutual collateral estoppel had achieved substantial definition. Following Blonder-Tongue, the requirement of mutuality no
longer applied to patent cases in which a party invoked defensive
collateral estoppel. The appropriateness of applying collateral estoppel instead would be tested by whether the party against whom
estoppel was sought had been afforded a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the first action."8 In Parklane, the Court
expanded this doctrine in two ways: first, nonmutuality was extended to non-patent cases, and second, offensive use of collateral
estoppel was approved subject to recognition of factors that make
the test of fairness more rigorous.6 The four factors articulated in
Parklane also gave added definition to the Supreme Court's grant
of "broad discretion" to trial judges.70 Mendoza represented the
first and, so far, the only retreat from the broad discretion the Supreme Court had vested in the lower courts. Following Mendoza,
attempts to assert nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government generally will fail because the Supreme Court has made

67. Id. at 573-74. In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist clarified that the statement "issues
such as those involved in this case" did not refer to the traditional hesitation about applying
collateral estoppel to unmixed questions of law. Id. at 574 n.7 (citing, inter alia, Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 179 (1980)); see also supra note 37 (discussing applicability of Montana v. United States to mutuality questions).
68. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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the government immune from most assertions of nonmutual collat71
eral estoppel.
D. Simultaneous Developments in General Finality Doctrine
The development of nonmutual collateral estoppel doctrine did
not take place in a vacuum. In the years between Blonder-Tongue
and Mendoza, the Supreme Court also decided several finality issues which were related only indirectly to nonmutuality, but which
placed nonmutual collateral estoppel in a more understandable
context. In Harris v. Washington, 2 for example, the Court reaffirmed the principle that the fifth 3 and fourteenth 4 amendment
protections against double jeopardy preclude retrying an ultimate
75
fact necessarily determined in a prior valid and final judgment.
Similarly, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet 8 the Court clearly
established that federal rules of res judicata do not preclude the
assertion of claims that could not have been raised in an earlier
action.77 Shortly after Parklane, the Supreme Court also decided
that collateral estoppel could apply to unmixed questions of law,"
and that res judicata did not preclude a bankruptcy court from
rehearing a previously decided state claim. 79
Two res judicata cases decided between 1981 and 1983 continued
the Supreme Court's practice of interweaving nonmutual collateral

71. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text. The first case to hint at the possibility
that nonmutual collateral estoppel generally would not be applicable to the government as a
litigant was Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980). See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue yet, many of the considerations
the Court cited as reasons for not preventing relitigation of decided issues by the federal
government on a nonmutual basis seem to apply with nearly equal force to state governments. Such a ruling by the Court could open a hole of greater social consequence in the
new nonmutual collateral estoppel doctrine.
72. 404 U.S. 55 (1971) (per curiam).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
74. Id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
75. 404 U.S. at 56-57.
76. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
77. Id. at 591-95.
78. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
79. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
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estoppel with other aspects of finality doctrine. In Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 0 the Court held that res judicata
rules afforded little discretion to lower courts."1 Apparently these
more settled rules required none of the broad experimentation the
Court was encouraging in the area of nonmutual collateral estoppel. Later, in Nevada v. United States,8 2 the Court compared the
abandonment of the mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel
to the continuation of the requirement in res judicata,83 but it held
that the mutuality requirement for res judicata cases had exceptions, including situations in which parties involved in the second
litigation but not the first nonetheless relied on the initial decree
to establish their rights. 4
Federal civil rights claims were a particularly frequent source of
finality doctrine disputes during this general period. In 1982, for
example, the Court held in Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Corp.85 that an employment discrimination complaint based on
federal civil rights law could not be religitated in federal court once
it had been reduced to judgment in state court.86 The Court built
on Kremer during the 1983 Term, in Migra v. Board of Education,8 7 by holding that federal civil rights claims that were actionable, but not raised in a prior state court proceeding, were subject
to the same res judicata rules in federal court that would have
been applied in state court.88
Several other decisions in the 1983 Term decided finality issues
not related directly to nonmutual collateral estoppel. In United
States v. One Assortment of Eighty-nine Firearms,89 the Court
held that an acquittal in a criminal proceeding creates no collateral
estoppel consequences applicable to a subsequent civil proceeding
involving some of the same issues.90 In McDonald v. City of West

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

452 U.S. 394 (1981).
Id. at 398-402.
463 U.S. 110 (1983).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
456 U.S. 461 (1982).
Id. at 485.
104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
Id. at 896.
104 S. Ct. 1099 (1984).
Id. at 1107.
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Branch,91 the Court established that federal courts hearing suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should not afford preclusive effect
to prior arbitration awards.9 2 Finally, in Cooper v. FederalReserve
Bank of Richmond,93 the Supreme Court explained that a prior
unfavorable decision in a civil rights class action alleging a general
practice of racial discrimination did not preclude litigation of an
individual class member's claim that he had been a victim of unlawful racial discrimination. 4
The development of doctrinal theory is only one facet of the operation of the American judicial system. Judicial doctrine also
must be obeyed and applied. A test of the applicability of a
judicial doctrine requires more than mere discovery of Supreme
Court holdings. Observers also must examine the operation of the
doctrine in lower courts, where the great bulk of cases are decided
and where the doctrine is subject to further explication. This Article now examines nonmutual collateral estoppel in federal appellate courts.9 5
III. NONMUTUAL COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE LOWER COURTS

A. The Context of Finality Doctrine
Blonder-Tongue and its Supreme Court progeny did not develop
in isolation, and the lower courts did not apply them as if they
had. Because the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel was
only part of the more comprehensive body of Supreme Court doctrine dealing with judicial finality,96 lower courts working with
nonmutuality also devoted substantial time and resources to questions of res judicata and collateral estoppel that did not bear directly on Blonder-Tongue problems. In the thirteen years between
Blonder-Tongue and Mendoza, the appellate courts addressed

91. 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
92. Id. at 1804.
93. 104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984).
94. Id. at 2802.
95. The following portion of this study derives exclusively from an examination of finality
doctrine in the federal circuit courts of appeals. It does not examine the operation of that
doctrine in the federal district courts because the percentage of district court opinions published is too small to constitute a reliable sample of all district court decisions.
96. See supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
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such concerns as the definition of identical issues or causes of action, 97 the requirements for privity between parties, 98 the effect of
intervening changes of law or fact on collateral estoppel,99 and the
applicability of collateral estoppel to pure issues of law.100 These
problems all relate to features of finality doctrine older than
Blonder-Tongue, and taken together constitute a body of legal
rules larger and more important than nonmutuality standing alone.
For that reason, the bulk of finality doctrine cases decided in the
lower courts during the period between Blonder-Tongue and Mendoza dealt with questions of res judicata or collateral estoppel unrelated to nonmutuality. This conclusion, in turn, suggests two

97. See, e.g., Anthan v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 672 F.2d 706 (8th Cir.

1982) (issue of emotional distress not identical in second action because applicable law in
second action required proof of an additional element to complete the tort); Schneider v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982)
(issue of nature of child's injury in first action not identical to issue of whether another
child received the same injury in the same airplane crash); White v. World Fin. of Meridian,
Inc., 653 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1981) (issue not identical when elements to be proved in second
action vary from elements proved in first action); Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80 (6th Cir.
1980) (difference between burden of proof in first action and second action makes issues
dissimilar); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Nix, 512 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1975) (issues in
first and second actions held identical even though first issue was framed under federal
labor law while second was framed under state contract law).
98. See, e.g., Gottheiner v. United States, 703 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1983) (individual who
controlled corporation is in privity with corporation); Vulcan, Inc. v. Fordees Corp., 658
F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982), (indenmitee is in privity with
indemnitor); Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903
(1977) (individual members of umbrella organization are in privity with organization); In re
Johnson, 518 F.2d 246 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) (trustee representing
trust against outsiders operates in different capacity than trustee defending allegation of
breach of fiduciary duty; difference in capacities vitiates possibility of trustee being in privity with himself).
99. Dracos v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 705 F.2d 1392 (4th Cir. 1983) (sudden changes in shipping industry preclude application of collateral estoppel to earlier findings); Mizokama Bros.
of Ariz., Inc. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 600 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding of first forum's
inconvenience does not estop assertion of another forum's convenience); Sydnes v. Commissioner, 647 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1977) (collateral estoppel invoked when, inter alia, facts and
law had not changed since first decision); Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 548
F.2d 594 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977) (intervening change of law bars invocation of collateral estoppel).
100. Herring v. SEC, 673 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1982) (collateral estoppel invoked on issue
of law); American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Secretary of HEW, 677 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(per curiam) (collateral estoppel not invoked on an issue of law due to a distinction in the
facts of the two cases); Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980) (collateral estoppel not invoked when federal agencies seek to relitigate issues of law).
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other considerations. First, nonmutuality is of relatively limited
importance in the larger context of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 1°1 Second, the appellate courts considering Blonder-Tongue
questions could draw upon analogies from related areas of finality
doctrine. The significance of these two considerations will be more
apparent following an analysis of the appellate courts' application
of nonmutual collateral estoppel.
B. Lower Court Decisions In The Post-Blonder-Tongue Era
In the years between Blonder-Tongue and Parklane, the circuits
were guided only by Blonder-Tongue in deciding nonmutual collateral estoppel cases. The Blonder-Tongue opinion was rooted so
firmly in considerations unique to patent law' 012 that a reluctance
to transplant nonmutuality to other legal conditions would have
been understandable. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit displayed some of that caution in Divine v. Commissioner,"' a tax case in which the taxpayer sought to use offensive collateral estoppel to prevent the government from relitigating
an issue previously decided in another circuit. 04 Refusing to invoke collateral estoppel, the Second Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's characterization of Blonder-Tongue as predominantly a
patent law decision:
It would be incorrect ... to assume that the [mutuality] reIn fact, the continuing life of
quirement has met its demise ....
the mutuality requirement in certain circumstances is suggested
by the Supreme Court's careful and precise phrasing of the issue
before it in Blonder-Tongue....

101. The importance of nonmutual collateral estoppel may be less than the aggregate importance of other areas of res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrine. Nevertheless, until
the Supreme Court eliminated the mutuality requirement, some courts were unable to address questions such as the identity of an issue, the impact of changing law or facts, or any
other collateral estoppel problem. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Smith Material
Corp., 616 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing the collateral estoppel benefits nonparties
may derive from a prior action).
102. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
103. 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974).
104. Id. at 1044-45. The Commissioner was trying to relitigate the identical legal issue
against a taxpayer who was a shareholder in the same corporation as the defendant in the
suit for which collateral estoppel was sought.
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.. .The Court disclaimed any intention to decide more than
"whether mutuality of estoppel is a viable rule where a patentee
seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent once a federal court
has declared it to be invalid."'105
Despite the Second Circuit's circumspect approach to nonmutual
collateral estoppel,206 this was not the major legacy of BlonderTongue. Even in Divine, the court cited reasons other than the restrictive language of Blonder-Tongue for not invoking nonmutual
collateral estoppel. 0 7 In fact, the court in Divine was almost bold
in one respect, because it refused to disqualify Divine's assertion of
offensive collateral estoppel even though Blonder-Tongue eschewed any consideration or approval of offensive collateral
estoppel. 108
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
even bolder. In Johnson v. United States,0 9 the court routinely
applied nonmutuality principles to a case involving offensive collateral estoppel. In Johnson, a negligence suit brought under the

105. Id. at 1046, 1048.
106. The Divine court was not alone in its reluctance. Even as late as 1978, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "[c]ollateral estoppel is applicable
only if the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions and if it was foreseeable
that the facts to be the subject of estoppel would be of importance in future litigation."
Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1978).
Similarly, in Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1974), the circuit court described Blonder-Tongue as a "severe attack" on the mutuality doctrine, implying that the "attack" had not ended the war against mutuality. Id. at 844. The court applied
nonmutual collateral estoppel anyway, describing the doctrine as "available as a defense in
this Circuit regardless of whether ... the party asserting the plea was a party (or privy) to
the prior litigation." Id.
107. The Second Circuit refused to invoke collateral estoppel primarily because its application against the government raised policy considerations not present in litigation between
private parties. 500 F.2d at 1047-49. The Second Circuit's decision anticipated by ten years
the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 568 (1984), that offensive collateral estoppel generally would not be available against the government. See supra
notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
108. 402 U.S. at 330 ("[T]he case before us involves neither due process nor 'offensive use'
questions.").
109. 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Johnson a year before the Supreme Court
decided Parklane.
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Federal Tort Claims Act, 110 the plaintiff asserted offensive collateral estoppel against the government with respect to a prior finding in a related decision. Noting that the government had not been
prejudiced procedurally in the first action and that the government
had a substantial incentive to litigate that case, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the government had been afforded a full and fair
opportunity to litigate. The court therefore invoked offensive collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the negligence issue. The only
bow the Fifth Circuit made to the disavowal of offensive collateral
estoppel expressed in Blonder-Tongue was an acknowledgement
that "the offensive use of collateral estoppel calls for the courts to
use special care in examining the circumstances to ascertain that
the defendant has in fact had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
and that preclusion will not lead to unjust results."'' Although
reaching a different result, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit followed a similar approach in Butler v. Stover
Bros. Trucking Co." 2 In that case, the court rejected application of
offensive collateral estoppel not because the Supreme Court had
withheld approval of offensive collateral estoppel, but because evidentiary restrictions unique to the first litigation had prejudiced
the defendants in that case."'
The most striking feature of these circuit decisions is the willingness of the appellate courts to anticipate the Supreme Court concerning offensive collateral estoppel. The cases also are noteworthy, however, because they remain faithful in all other respects to
the Blonder-Tongue test of fairness for nonmutual collateral estoppel. The circuits may have had some doubts about BlonderTongue's applicability outside the context of patent law," 4 but in

110. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1983).
111. 576 F.2d at 614.
112. 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1977).
113. Id. The evidentiary restriction in the first case was a state dead man's statute, which
prevented one of the defendants from testifying on his own behalf in that litigation. Because
the second action involved no deceased persons, the defendant was eligible to testify if collateral estoppel was not invoked. Id. at 551.
114. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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cases in which those doubts were resolved in favor of invoking nonmutual collateral estoppel, the appellate courts showed substantial
facility in applying the Blonder-Tongue approach."15
C. The Influence of Parklane on Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel
1. Introduction: Offensive CollateralEstoppel
Parklane affected the circuits' approach to collateral estoppel in
several ways: first, it ratified the already existing practice of applying nonmutual collateral estoppel offensively;"' second, it warned
the appellate courts that offensive collateral estoppel should be approached with particular caution; 117 and third, it added new discretionary considerations to those identified in Blonder-Tongue.""
The third consequence was particularly significant because it represented the most guidance the Supreme Court had ever given in
identifying specific factors to be considered in normal collateral estoppel analysis. Of the four factors identified in Parklane,"9 two
had been mentioned already in Blonder-Tongue: the potential absence of incentive to litigate the first action, and the possibility of
some procedural disadvantage to a party in the first suit.120 This

overlap created an opportunity to blend the approaches to both
115. In Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1974), for example,
the court granted defensive collateral estoppel under Blonder-Tongue because, inter alia,
"[t]here ha[d] been no demonstration that Scooper Dooper was denied a full and fair opportunity-procedurally, substantively, or evidentially-to present its case." Id. at 845.
116. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
118. Apart from considerations apparently unique to patent law, the Court in BlonderTongue identified two factors that might have general application in nonmutual collateral
estoppel analysis: disincentive to litigate the first action and procedural disadvantages in the
first action. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In Parklane,the Court added the
concern that offensive collateral estoppel might undermine the purpose of finality doctrine
to encourage judicial economy because it provided the plaintiff with an incentive to remain
outside the first litigation, hoping for a favorable result. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The Court also suggested that offensive collateral estoppel might not be appropriate if a decision existed with a result inconsistent with the decision for which estoppel was
sought. See supra note 28 and accompanying text
119. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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types of nonmutual collateral estoppel. The circuits have taken advantage of that opportunity by treating these common factors similarly whether the estoppel has been asserted offensively or defensively. The central difference in appellate court approaches to
offensive and defensive collateral estoppel is in the circuits' response to the High Court admonition to apply offensive collateral
estoppel more gingerly.'12 The circuits have responded chiefly by
considering the Parklane factors that are largely unique to offensive collateral estoppel.
2. Failure To Join the PriorAction
A plaintiff's failure to join an earlier action is a discretionary
consideration which has been raised in a number of cases. 2 2 The
majority of circuits have followed Parklane closely, holding that
persons who could have joined an initial action without difficulty
may not benefit from offensive collateral estoppel in a subsequent
action. 12 3 In Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 24 the United States Court

121. See, e.g., Luben Indus., Inc. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1983)
(district court has "broad discretion to deny the application of offensive collateral estoppel
where 'the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant' "); Nations v.
Sun Oil Co., 705 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 239 (1983)
("Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine. Offensive collateral estoppel is even a cut
above that in the scale of equitable values."); Mancuso v. Harris, 677 F.2d 206, 209 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019 (1982) (lower courts have authority, not an obligation, to apply
collateral estoppel offensively); Carr v. District of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599, 605 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (offensive use of collateral estoppel is "use of issue preclusion as a sword").
122. Mere failure to join in the earlier action by itself should not cause a court to refuse
invocation of offensive collateral estoppel. The decision rests instead on the party's motives
for not joining the earlier action.
123. See, e.g., Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 280 (8th Cir. 1979) (offensive collateral
estoppel not invoked because no "impediment prevented the Oldhams from filing a complaint or complaints against Pritchett and the other defendants for consolidation with the
claims adjudicated in the first proceeding"); Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d
544, 551 (7th Cir. 1977) ("This court believes that it would be unfair to allow plaintiff to
assume a position better than that which he would have enjoyed had he participated in the
state action."); see also Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 980 (1980) (petitioner actually had not foregone a reasonable opportunity to intervene in the first action, but the court denied estoppel, citing Parklane'sholding that "collateral estoppel should not be applied when the plaintiff could have easily joined the prior
action"); cf. Carr v. District of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (offensive collateral estoppel granted because, inter alia, plaintiff who did not join other action had
"compelling reasons" not to join).
124. 662 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1981).
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit described the phenomenon of abstaining from participation in the first action and seeking offensive
collateral estoppel in the second as a "ride on [the coattails]" of
the first plaintiff.1 5 In Nations v. Sun Oil Co., 126 the Fifth Circuit
again demonstrated its fidelity to the practice of dealing sternly
with parties who do not pursue aggressively opportunities to participate in the first action. Nations was injured in an industrial accident in which two co-workers were killed. Representatives of the
deceased workers' estates sued promptly and won, in part because
the court found that the defendant was a statutory employer. By
the time Nations sued, however, state law on the status of the defendant had changed, and the Fifth Circuit held that the new law
applied to Nations' case. Rejecting his plea for application of collateral estoppel on the issue of the defendant's status, the court
remarked that "the application of current law [to Nations] is the
result of his delay in bringing suit. His choice to await maturity of
all sequela of his injuries and the decision in the [first] case resulted in the intervention of the [state] decision. 11 2 7 Although the
Fifth Circuit had conceded that Nations "had the right to await
the full development of his injuries within the statute of limitations period,"' 12 8 Nations lost the benefit of offensive collateral estoppel partly because he did not participate as a plaintiff in the
first suit.
In some cases, lower courts have permitted offensive collateral
estoppel without discussing the plaintiff's failure to join an earlier

125. Id. at 1172. More than "coattails," however, were involved in Hicks. The decision for
which collateral estoppel was sought rested on alternate grounds, and the argument of the
plaintiff in the first case was so strong on one issue that the Fifth Circuit suspected the trial
judge might not have considered the other issue-which was more important in the second
action-as carefully as he would have otherwise. The court also disavowed any suspicion
"that there was any collusion between the plaintiffs in Hicks and [the first plaintiff], or that
the Hicks plaintiffs deliberately waited for the [first] litigation to conclude before filing
their own lawsuits. There was no evidence in the record which would support such a hypothesis, nor was there any showing that intervention in [the first case] was possible for any or
all of them." Id. Nevertheless, the court spoke in terms of "coattails" and added, "It is
difficult to imagine a more sympathetic plaintiff than [the first plaintiff]." Id.
126. 705 F.2d 742 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 239 (1983).
127. Id. at 745.
128. Id. at 744.
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action. This apparent lapse may be explained by the plaintiff's inability to join an earlier action easily. 12 9 In the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, a party's burden of explaining why he did not join an earlier action is extraordinarily
light. In Starker v. United States,5 0 for example, a taxpayer
sought the benefit of offensive collateral estoppel for the same issue litigated previously by his son and daughter-in-law. Although
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the opportunity-to-join principle of Parklane presented "troublesome questions,"' 3' it ultimately resolved them in favor of the plaintiff:
In the present case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 may have technically authorized T.J. Starker's joinder in his son and daughter-in-law's
refund suit. The father's suit differs from that of his son in so
many respects, however, that there are numerous possible explanations why T.J. Starker-or for that matter, Bruce and Elizabeth Starker-might have wanted the lawsuits tried separately.
We decline to speculate on motivation. This is not a case in
which a litigant adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude for the obvious purpose of eluding the binding force of an initial resolution
of a simple issue.13 2
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion, however, is nearly as "troublesome" as the questions the court believed it faced. For example, it
may well be that the taxpayer had not adopted a "wait-and-see"
attitude, but the Ninth Circuit offers only a conclusion on that
point, without explaining its reasoning. Moreover, though the father's suit "differ[ed] from that of his son in so many respects," 33
those differences were not particularly material to the resolution of

129. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984); Bank of Heflin v. Landmark Inns of Am., Inc., 604 F.2d 354
(5th Cir. 1979). In Mendoza, the plaintiff simply might not have known of the prior action.
Both actions were brought in federal district courts in California, but the first action was
heard in the Northern District while the second was heard in the Central District. In
Landmark Inns, the plaintiff may have been unaware of the prior actions, or its case may
have had sufficiently different facts to justify not entering the other actions.
130. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
131. Id. at 1349.
132. Id. at 1349-50.
133. Id. at 1349; see also id. at 1349 n.6 (detailing the factual distinctions between the
cases).
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either dispute.134 Finally, the Ninth Circuit implicitly placed the
burden of demonstrating why the plaintiff should have joined the
prior action on the opponent of offensive collateral estoppel. In
Starker, at least, the court probably should have required the
plaintiff to demonstrate good cause for not having joined the prior
action.
3. Incentive to Litigate
In Parklane the Court was sensitive to the risk that offensive
collateral estoppel could unfairly preclude relitigation of an issue
that a defendant had insufficient incentive to litigate in a prior action. The Supreme Court hypothesized a suit involving a relatively
trivial sum followed by an unforeseen and more consequential suit
involving the same issue. 135 The Court found three facts, however,
demonstrating that the defendant in Parklane had sufficient incentive to litigate: the first suit involved serious charges; the trial
lasted four days and was followed by an appeal, which indicated
that the defendant had in fact litigated vigorously; and the plaintiff began his suit before the action on which the defendant
claimed estoppel was filed.' 3 6
The circuits generally have followed Parklane's "incentive"
guideline with little difficulty. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit echoed Parklane in holding
that robust litigation in the first action would negate an allegation
of insufficient incentive to litigate. 3 7 In the same case, the court
also held that the plaintiff could establish the adequacy of the demade
fendant's incentive to litigate by showing that all arguments
138
suit.
first
the
in
presented
were
case
second
the
in

134. See id. at 1342-44, 1349 n.6.
135. 439 U.S. at 330.
136. Id. at 322 n.18. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit identified
similar considerations even before Parklanewas decided. See Johnson v. United States, 576
F.2d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
137. Carr v. District of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980); accord Lujan v.
Department of Interior, 673 F.2d 1165, 1168 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982)
(actual prior litigation established incentive to litigate).
138. Carr, 646 F.2d at 605.
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Because the circuits have agreed that insufficient incentive to
appeal is tantamount to insufficient incentive to litigate, the absence of a good motive or opportunity to appeal the first decision
will bar subsequent application of offensive collateral estoppel. 139
Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co.'40 illustrates particularly well how the
incentive to appeal differs from the incentive to litigate at trial. In
the prior litigation for which Hicks sought collateral estoppel, the
plaintiff had prevailed on two alternate grounds, either of which
would have sustained the judgment. Only one was relevant to
Hicks. The facts supporting the other decisional basis were so
strong that any attempt to appeal and win on the ground relevant
to Hicks would have been pyrrhic even if successful. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, therefore, had little
difficulty finding that the defendant had no incentive to appeal.' 4 '
The courts have differed concerning which factors should be
considered in determining whether a party had an adequate incentive to appeal. The split typically appears when public entities are
the intended targets of offensive collateral estoppel.' 42 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held twice that,
for a state or federal government defendant, the mere loss of a trial
court decision may not be a sufficient incentive to appeal. In Olegario v. United States,43 the court refused to apply offensive collateral estoppel to a prior decision unfavorable to the government,
partially because the government had considered factors other
than the merits of the first case in deciding not to appeal.'4 In
reasoning that ultimately would be adopted by the Supreme Court

139. See, e.g., Mancuso v. Harris, 677 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019
(1982) (no collateral estoppel because, inter alia, state did not have sufficient incentive to
appeal adverse decision); Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1981) (no collateral estoppel because defendant lacked incentive to appeal first decision).
140. 622 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1981).
141. Id. at 1171-72.
142. The Supreme Court ruled recently that offensive collateral estoppel generally will
not be available against the federal government. United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568
(1984); see supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text. The Court never has held, however,
that the same insulation against offensive collateral estoppel is available to governmental
entities below the federal level. See supra note 71.
143. 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981).
144. Id. at 215.
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for the broader purpose of barring application of offensive collateral estoppel in most cases involving the government as a defendant, 145 the Second Circuit commented:
a determination to forego further judicial review of an adverse
decision . . . may result from a variety of factors-scarcity of
resources, potential impact, public interest-which are unrelated
to the legal issues in the case. . . . If each adverse decision were
accorded the collateral estoppel effect urged . . . the Solicitor
General would be forced
to seek review of cases that would not
146
otherwise be appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
adopted a contrary position in a case involving the preclusive effect
of the same decision at issue in Olegario. The Ninth Circuit gave
short shrift to the government's arguments that it had not appealed the earlier decision because it had not appreciated the
case's subsequent significance, and that offensive collateral estoppel should not be applied against the government in any case.
Finding "no 'critical' need" for relitigating the issues decided previously, 147 the Ninth Circuit remarked, "It is not for this court to
speculate on the reason the Solicitor General reversed his position
after withdrawing the government's appeal in [the first

litigation] .11148
The Ninth Circuit also conflicts with another circuit regarding
the amount of money that must be at stake to provide a defendant
with sufficient incentive to litigate the original case fully. In
Starker v. United States,149 the Ninth Circuit held that offensive
collateral estoppel could be applied in a $300,000 suit because a
145. United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984); see supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
146. 629 F.2d at 215; accord Mancuso v. Harris, 677 F.2d 206, 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1019 (1982) ("It also cannot be assumed that the State has an equal incentive to
vigorously litigate claims for habeas corpus brought by each of several co-defendants. Differences in culpability and in willingness to plead guilty no doubt influence the State's decisions in this regard.").
147. Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320, 1329 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
148. Id. at 1328; cf. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1979) (government's failure to appeal used only to indicate that decision for which offensive collateral
estoppel was sought was not inconsistent with established law).
149. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
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prior suit, which involved $37,000, gave the government "plenty of
incentive" to litigate seriously.' 50 By contrast, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to apply collateral
estoppel to a decision in which the defendant had to pay a judgment of $35,000, because it was "a small amount" compared to the
$400,000 at issue in the subsequent action. 15 1 Apart from the manifest disagreement about the significance of the sum of money at
stake in the first litigation, these decisions also leave undecided
other issues which relate to money at stake as a measure of incentive to litigate. For example, neither court addressed whether incentive is measured merely by the absolute sum at stake in the
first litigation, or whether a court also should consider the relation
12
between that sum and the amount at issue in the second action
or the subjective importance of the amount of money to a defendant of a particular financial status.
4. PriorInconsistent Decisions
The Ninth Circuit decision in Starker also considered the effect
of prior inconsistent decisions on the ability to invoke offensive
collateral estoppel. In Starker, the court held that the absence of

150. Id. at 1349.
151. Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1171 (5th Cir. 1981). In Hicks, the court
also noted that other potential plaintiffs existed, and that if they sued and sought collateral
estoppel effect for the first decision the financial consequences of the initial adjudication
would be even greater. Id. Similarly, in Carr v. District of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir.
1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that
the government had sufficient incentive to litigate a prior action apparently involving title
to six parcels of property in the District of Columbia, noting that "only one alley is involved
in the current Carr litigation." Id. at 605.
The Ninth Circuit also conflicts with the Second Circuit concerning the collateral estoppel
effect of the government's ability to foresee the consequences of a particular adjudication.
Compare Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320, 1326-28 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984) (government could foresee possibility of substantial subsequent litigation), with Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 980 (1981) (implicitly accepting government argument that consequences of first
decision could not be foreseen adequately).
152. Money was not involved in Carr v. District of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir.
1980), but the court seemed to measure the value of the items at issue in the first suit
against the value of the item at issue in the second suit.
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prior inconsistent decisions is a factor indicating the fairness of invoking collateral estoppel in a particular situation.1 53 The Starker
decision is in line with the Supreme Court opinion in Parklane,in
which the Court held that prior inconsistent decisions usually
1
should prevent the invocation of collateral estoppel. 5
A subsequent Ninth Circuit decision indicates that prior inconsistent decisions will not always prevent the operation of offensive
collateral estoppel. In Mendoza v. United States,5 5 the Ninth Circuit ignored an inconsistency between a federal district court decision and the holding of another circuit court, explaining: "In this
case, there is only one inconsistent judgment, and the inconsistency stems from a conflict between the courts of two circuits, not
from any apparently fortuitous jury decision or an intervening
statutory change 'in the law. 1 56 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also ignored a prior inconsistent decision in Carr v. District of Columbia.57 In Carr,the
court noted that the. local court decision to which it afforded
preclusive effect was based on superior information not available
to the Court of Claims when it made its prior inconsistent decision. 158 Mendoza and Carr,however, both involved special circumstances. The Ninth Circuit's routine use of prior inconsistent decisions in a case not involving the special circumstances of Mendoza
or Carrsuggests that the circuits generally have little difficulty applying the prior inconsistent decisions factor first mentioned in
Parklane.159

153. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The fairness aspects
of ParklaneHosiery do not preclude our applying collateral estoppel here .... The judgment in [the prior case] was not inconsistent with any known prior authority.").
154. 439 U.S. at 331, 332; see supra notes 28, 33 and accompanying text.
155. 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).

156. Id. at 1329.
157. 646 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

158. Id. at 606.
159. See Crawford v. Ranger Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1981) (intervening
unreported inconsistent decision justified denial of offensive collateral estoppel). Given the
Ninth Circuit's occasional tendency to differ with the other circuits in its use of the Parklane factors, see supra notes 129-34, 147-52 and accompanying text, Crawford might seem
to have some particular significance. In another decision, however, the Ninth Circuit refused
to apply offensive collateral estoppel because the circuit court decision for which estoppel
was sought conflicted with decisions from other circuits, remarking, "[W]e generally do not
consider ourselves bound by the law of other circuits in environmental cases." Western Oil
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5. ProceduralDisadvantages in PriorLitigation
The perceived unfairness of permitting the use of offensive collateral estoppel against a defendant who suffered from procedural
disadvantages in the first suit'1 0 has evoked two lines of response
from the circuits. One reaction has been to use the absence of procedural disadvantage as a factor that supports application of offensive collateral estoppel. 16' This approach usually produces little
real harm, but it is difficult to reconcile with the proposition that
the burden of proving the applicability of collateral estoppel falls
on the party seeking its benefit. The party opposed to its application should have no obligation to show that it should not be imposed. 62 The other response has been to the various procedural
disadvantages present in the first litigation which make application
of collateral estoppel unfair. For example, in Luben Industries,
Inc. v. United States,'6" the United States Court of Appeals for

& Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1980). This comment is fairly innocuous
when viewed as a statement that the Ninth Circuit is free to ignore the stare decisis effect
of decisions from the other circuits. Offered as an additional reason for not applying offensive collateral estoppel to the decision of another circuit, however, it seems at odds with the
basic underpinnings of the finality doctrine itself. But see American Medical Int'l, Inc. v.
Secretary of HEW, 677 F.2d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[C]ourts of appeals ... have never
considered themselves hidebound by other circuits on legal questions involving federal
agency defendants.").
160. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. In Blonder-Tongue, Justice White raised
procedural disadvantage as a factor to be evaluated in determining the fullness and fairness
of the parties' prior opportunity to litigate. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In
Parklane, the Court recognized the continuing applicability of this factor to cases involving
both offensive and defensive collateral estoppel. 439 U.S. at 331 n.15.
161. See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he government does not argue that the first trial did not afford it a full and fair opportunity to present its theory of the case.") On this point the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is not
as isolated as it has been in other matters of offensive collateral estoppel, see, e.g., supra
note 159, because other courts have made similar remarks. See, e.g., Carr v. District of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (offensive collateral estoppel held applicable because "the United States does not assert, nor could it plausibly, that federal court procedures afford it outcome influencing opportunities unavailable in the District of Columbia
courts"); Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966
(1981) (issue was "hotly contested"); Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 280 (8th Cir. 1979)
(approving application of defensive collateral estoppel because, inter alia, "the Oldhams
were not restricted substantively or evidentially in the [prior] action").
162. See, e.g., Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1979) (party seeking collateral estoppel has burden of establishing its applicability).
163. 707 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1983).
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the Ninth Circuit refused to apply offensive collateral estoppel to a
prior interlocutory holding, partly because there had been no op64
portunity to appeal that holding.1
6. Considerationsof Nonmutuality Beyond Parklane
The Supreme Court left open the possibility that considerations
not enumerated in Parklane might govern the applicability of collateral estoppel in a particular case.16 5 In fact, underlying the
Court's call for a case-by-case determination of the fairness of applying collateral estoppel is the Court's desire to preserve the lower
courts' discretion to consider variables other than those articulated
in Parklane.6 So far, however, the lower courts have not found it
necessary to stray substantially from the general guidelines of
Parklane.In Western Oil & Gas Association v. EPA,167 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remarked that Parklane "did not purport to provide an exhaustive list of factors to be
considered in making [a collateral estoppel] determination." 0 The

164. Id. at 1040; see also Haung Tang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 523 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir.
1975) (refusing to invoke offensive collateral estoppel partly because the procedures of the
foreign court which previously had decided the issue provided less protection than California procedures; court applied California's essentially similar rules concerning collateral estoppel); Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1977) (described below).
In Butler, an offensive collateral estoppel case decided before Parklane, a truck driver
involved in a three-truck accident sued the driver and owner of one of the other trucks,
alleging negligence. In an earlier state court action, the administrator of the estate of the
driver of the third truck maintained a successful suit against the current defendants for
wrongful death. The plaintiff in Butler sought to use the result of the prior action to estop
the defendants' denial of negligence. The Seventh Circuit, applying the federal rule on nonmutual collateral estoppel, concluded that the invocation of collateral estoppel against the
defendants would be unfair. The court reasoned that because the defendant driver had been
barred by a state dead man's statute from testifying in the wrongful death suit but was not
disabled from testifying in the instant suit, the invocation of collateral estoppel would deny
the defendants the full opportunity to litigate which the doctrine of nonmutual collateral
estoppel required. Id. at 551. In short, Blonder-Tongue had provided sufficient guidance for
the court to make the transition from Blonder-Tongue's holding in a defensive collateral
estoppel context to the offensive collateral estoppel problem in Butler. On another point,
however, the Seventh Circuit did not do as well. Nowhere did the court explain why it used
federal collateral estoppel rules when a federal statute required the use of state law to determine the collateral estoppel effect of a state judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
165. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.
166. See id.
167. 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980).
168. Id. at 809.
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court used its discretion, however, merely to include consideration
of an older, but still applicable, collateral estoppel doctrine holding
that either a change in the law or separability of the facts of two
cases could be grounds for precluding collateral estoppel.' 9 Additionally, two other circuits elected not to require adversity between
co-parties to prior litigation before either could invoke collateral
estoppel. 17 0 In most cases, however, the appellate courts have not
ventured far beyond the considerations enumerated in BlonderTongue and Parklane when making collateral estoppel decisions.
D. Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel Applied to the Government
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mendoza 171
foreclosed the possibility that nonmutual collateral estoppel could
be available against the government. 172 Prior to Mendoza many
circuit court decisions had considered the government's status in
1 73
collateral estoppel analysis identical to that of private parties,

169. Id. For a discussion of some of the pre-existing rules of collateral estoppel, see supra
notes 97-101 and cases cited therein.
170. Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 278 (8th Cir. 1979); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v.
Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1974). Scooper Dooper predates Parklane,so the
source of the court's assumption of discretion seems to be both Blonder-Tongue and the
traditional assumption of the Third Circuit that it has substantial freedom to act in matters
relating to collateral estoppel. See id. at 844 (Third Circuit decisions have resulted in "[tihe
virtual obliteration of the mutuality doctrine in this Circuit").
171. 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
172. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
173. In some cases, courts permitted offensive collateral estoppel against the government.
Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984);
Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d
606 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1980). Courts in other cases refused to
apply offensive collateral estoppel against the government, but only after application of the
standard Blonder-Tongue/Parklane factors. Luben Indus., Inc. v. United States, 707 F.2d
1037 (9th Cir. 1983); Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also invoked
offensive collateral estoppel against the government, but described the litigation before the
court as "this unique case." Carr v. District of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
The same court later suggested that it had not yet opted for the general application of
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Secretary of HEW, 677 F.2d 118, 122 (1981) (per curiam); see infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
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although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had reached a different conclusion. In Divine v. Commissioner,17 4 a tax case decided nearly five years before ParkIane,the
Second Circuit had characterized Blonder-Tongue merely as a patent case establishing a principle of nonmutual collateral estoppel
applicable only "to certain classes of issues which for policy reasons it has been decided should generally be litigable only once. "'75
The court noted that tax litigation gives rise to different policy
considerations.
More so than most laws, the tax statutes are far reaching and
affect or might affect millions of citizens. The issues which arise
in the course of administering these laws are thus of importance
not only to the particular litigants but also to the general public.
Moreover, because of the sheer extent of the subject matter of
the revenue laws and their intricate language, the issues which
confront the courts will often be pure issues of law concerning
the interpretation of novel and cryptic sections of the Code.
Thus, because of the unusual complexity of the tax laws, judicial
conflicts over interpretations of law, as opposed to disagreement
as to how the law should be applied to specific facts, are much
more apt to occur than in other areas of federal concern. For
example, judicial conflicts in the patent area typically concern
the application of undisputed principles of law to a complicated
array of facts and do not reflect differences over what the governing principles of law mean. 17 6

The court concluded that nonmutual collateral estoppel was not
applicable to tax decisions. 177 The geographic reach of tax law and
the unusual complexity of the pure issues of law in most tax litigation convinced the court of the special public interest in thoroughly developing tax doctrine. The Second Circuit feared such
development would be thwarted if it was applied to nonmutual col178
lateral estoppel.
Several years later the Second Circuit reaffirmed its refusal to
invoke nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. The

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1048-49.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1049-50.
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court's opinion, however, contained some subtle but significant
changes. Although Divine had emphasized the special public interest in tax law, 79 Olegario v. United States'80 rested on the public
interest involved in all government litigation, particularly the issues of immigration law and constitutional interpretation involved
in Olegario itself.'' The court refused to apply offensive collateral
estoppel, reasoning that "[i]n contrast to Parklane, the government is the defendant here, and the case raises important issues of
national concern." 8 2 At the very least, Olegario indicated that the
Second Circuit now was prepared to deny application of nonmutual collateral estoppel in all government' s - litigation involving
an important national interest. The court, however, did not specify
how to measure the importance of a public interest.""
The Second Circuit's reluctance to invoke nonmutual collateral
estoppel against the government, as modified by Olegario, soon attracted a disciple. In American Medical International,Inc. v. Secretary of HEW,'i 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to apply Blonder-Tongue and
Parklane because offensive collateral estoppel was sought against
the government. The court stated:
Were this a case involving only private litigants or only simple
issues of fact, we would not hesitate to conclude that an estoppel
should arise .... This is not, however, a typical case. A federal
agency, not a private party, lost on an issue of federal law, not
an issue of fact, in the first lawsuit. To allow nonparties to the
[prior] ruling to win simply on the basis of an estoppel would
179. Id.; cf. Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 950 (1980) (nonmutual collateral estoppel denied in part because the government
was protecting an important public interest).
180. 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981).
181. Id. at 207-12.
182. Id. at 215.
183. Using similar reasoning, the Second Circuit also has refused to invoke offensive collateral estoppel against state governments. See Mancuso v. Harris, 677 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019 (1982).
184. In contrast to the Second Circuit's decision in Olegario, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the public interest issues at stake in Olegario
were not important enough to justify a special exemption from offensive collateral estoppel
for the government. See Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320, 1329 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
185. 677 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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mean that we simply and uncritically bind ourselves to follow
another court's interpretation of a federal statute in virtually all
cases involving that legislation. The broader and more serious
implication of such a holding is that the first court to hear a case
raising a public law issue litigable only with the Federal Government would-if it ruled against the Government-rigidify the
law to be applied by every court in every case presenting that
issue.1s 6

The District of Columbia Circuit identified the same two reasons
as the Second Circuit for not routinely applying Parklane principles when the government was threatened with collateral estoppel:
the presence of pure issues of law, and the special public interest
inherent in any litigation involving the government. 187 When the
Supreme Court made Blonder-Tongue and Parklane inapplicable
to the government, 18 8 it adopted the general assumption of these
two circuits that government litigation was characterized by matters of public interest important enough to preclude application of
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government.'8 9

186. Id. at 121.
187. In American Medical, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was
able to distinguish its decision in Carr to grant offensive collateral estoppel against the government, because Carr had addressed "legal issues of only local import--those unlikely to
be raised in other circuits." Id. at 122, n.28. This distinction is analogous to decisions in
which other circuit courts have allowed the principles of Blonder-Tongue and Parklaneto
operate against the government when the issue for which nonmutual collateral estoppel was
sought was unlikely to arise again. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
No Supreme Court, Second Circuit, or District of Columbia Circuit decision precludes the
use of nonmutual collateral estoppel by the government against a private party. Moreover,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has approved the invocation of
nonmutual collateral estoppel by the government against a private party. Lujan v. Department of Interior, 673 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
188. United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984); see supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. The High Court, however, rejected
the alternative ground raised by the Second and District of Columbia Circuits. Justice
Rehnquist explained in a footnote that the Supreme Court's decision "in no way depends"
on the theory that collateral estoppel should not apply to unmixed questions of law. United
States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 574 n.7 (1984). Moreover, the Court took pains to ensure
that the prohibition against the use of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government
would be general and would not depend on the ability of lower courts to identify a particular public interest. See id. at 574.
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E. Summary of Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel in the Lower
Courts
A review of the decade-long effort of the appellate courts to construe and apply Supreme Court nonmutual collateral estoppel doctrine discloses several notable features. For example, the circuits
adapted easily to the change from the mutuality requirement to
the new test of fairness. Confusion of the magnitude that followed
some other doctrinal changes 90 simply did not occur. Questions
about the applicability of Blonder-Tongue to litigation not involving issues of patent law created some uncertainty, 1 1 but this uncertainty undoubtedly was attributable to the patent law pigeon92
hole into which the Supreme Court first placed the new doctrine.1
For the most part, however, the appellate courts demonstrated a
marked facility in applying the case-by-case analysis the Supreme
93
Court had envisioned.
Parklane's approval of offensive collateral estoppel proved to be
more of an opportunity than a burden for the -lower courts. Some
circuits already had applied the new nonmutuality doctrine offensively, even though the Supreme Court had not addressed offensive
collateral estoppel in Blonder-Tongue."" After Parklane,other circuits followed suit. The lower courts were faithful, even scrupulous, in their efforts to apply the more elaborate indicia of fairness
suggested in Parklane, and for the most part the circuits' discretionary use of those factors has worked quite well.' 9 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Mendoza to afford the government general immunity from nonmutual collateral estoppel clearly
caught some circuits off guard. 96 Misleading language in Standefer

190. For an extreme example of the confusion that can follow the introduction of new
doctrine, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny.
191. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1977); see also
supra note 164 (describing facts and holding in Butler).
194. See Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1018 (1981).
195. The Ninth Circuit has some trouble making analyses consistent with the other circuits in approach and results. See supra notes 129-34, 147-52, 159. The differences, however,
are not dramatic and merely may reflect the discretion the Supreme Court intended to vest
in the lower courts.
196. See supra notes 171-89 and accompanying text.
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v. United States197 may have caused that surprise. In Standefer
the High Court recognized only the possibility that nonmutuality
would not apply because in some cases involving government defendants a relevant public interest outweighed considerations of
economy and efficiency. 198 Standefer apparently influenced some
pre-Mendoza appellate decisions which rejected blanket immunity
for the government, because some courts searched for a public interest and used it to determine whether the government was immune from nonmutual collateral estoppel. 199 When Mendoza provided general immunity because the government was a public
party commonly involved in repetitious litigation, without regard
to the presence of any significant public interest in a particular
issue,200 the language in Standefer finally was identified as a false
trail.
Apart from the misunderstanding Standefer may have created,
the Mendoza exception created no more disruption for the appellate courts than reasonably might have been anticipated during the
development of a Supreme Court doctrine that could have been
resolved more than one way. Minimal disruption occurred because
the High Court waited for the circuits to thrash out the various
arguments concerning the government exception. The Court acted
only after the positions of both sides had been considered sufficiently. Mendoza affected enough decisions to indicate that the
best arguments for a more limited immunity rule had been made,
but it did not come so late that a legion of circuit court decisions
were overturned. In the end, the Court created a rule the lower
courts could apply with little difficulty.20 1 Overall, the development
197. 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
198. Id. at 24-25; note 43 and accompanying text.
199. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Mendoza itself is similar in reasoning to Standefer.
See 672 F.2d at 1329 (government has shown no crucial public need for denying use of

nonmutual collateral estoppel). The opinion never refers to Standefer by name, but the case
may have been discussed in the government brief. One other post-Standefer Ninth Circuit
decision used the standard Blonder-Tongue/Parklanetest to determine the applicability of
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government, but also did not refer to Standefer.
Luben Indus., Inc. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1983).

200. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
201. In Mendoza, the Court hinted that nonmutual collateral estoppel still may be ap-

plied against the government in a case in which the facts are not likely to be repeated. See
104 S. Ct. at 574. The status of this potential exception, which could prove troublesome to
lower courts, remains uncertain.
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and application of the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel
appears to have been a substantial success.
Success with one doctrine, however, does not necessarily indicate
that success can be replicated with other doctrines. More important than the happy evolution of one judicial rule is identification
of the causes of that success. Only after these causes are identified
and evaluated for their generic applicability can generalizations be
drawn concerning the appropriate steps and the potential pitfalls
in developing other judicial doctrine. One method of identifying
these causes is to compare the operation of one doctrine to that of
another. When successful doctrines have common features, correlation suggests that subsequently developed judicial doctrines should
attempt to incorporate those features. Additionally, much can be
learned even when one doctrine is successful and the other is not.
Differences between doctrines may stand out as causal elements of
success or failure. To obtain the benefit of comparison, this Article
reviews briefly the judicial doctrine of retroactivity, examined at
length in an earlier Article.2 °2
IV. A

SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL DOCTRINE OF RETROACTIVITY

Retroactivity analysis is the process by which a court determines
whether a recent judicial alteration in the law should be applied to
events that occurred prior to the announcement of the change. The
Supreme Court occasionally has enunciated various retroactivity
rules for certain categories of cases such as federal diversity litigation, disputes concerning agency decisions, matters relating to federal court jurisdiction, and civil cases with a direct appeal pending
when the law is changed. 20 3 The aspect of retroactivity analysis
that has drawn the most attention in the last twenty years, however, is the doctrine first enunciated by the Court in Linkletter v.
Walker.0 4 Linkletter addressed the retroactive effect of Mapp v.
Ohio,20 5 in which the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied
to warrantless searches by state officers in violation of the fourth 20 6

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See Corr, supra note 2.
See id. at 762-63, 784-92.
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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and fourteenth 07 amendments to the United States Constitution.
The Court held that no constitutional command made Mapp automatically retroactive, so the approach to retroactivity could be
shaped at the Court's discretion. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, said, "Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each
case." 208 He 20 9concluded that Mapp should not be applied
retroactively.
Three factors enunciated in Linkletter were of even greater consequence to retroactivity doctrine than the decision itself. These
considerations, which soon became the factors used in making retroactivity decisions in areas not covered by other rules, were the
purpose of the new rule, the degree to which parties reasonably
may have relied on the old rule, and the real-world consequences
that would follow if the new rule of law were made generally retroactive. 210 Several years later, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,211 the

Supreme Court announced a doctrine applicable to civil cases not
controlled by other retroactivity rules which resembled the factors
mentioned in Linkletter.1 2 Together, Linkletter and Chevron
207. Id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.
3.
208. 381 U.S. at 629.
209. Id. at 640.
210. Id. at 629, 636-38. In Mapp, every consideration pointed to prospectivity. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct; applying the exclusionary rule to
conduct that already had taken place would not have served that purpose. Also, state trial
judges, in reliance on the old rule permitting the use of unlawfully obtained evidence, had
not segregated lawfully seized evidence from evidence which would be inadmissible under
Mapp. Finally, retroactive application of Mapp would have required retrials in many cases
where the defendant's guilt was not at issue. If the passage of time had made retrials practically impossible, the result might have been a wholesale release of persons whose guilt already was established. Id.
The three considerations articulated by the Court in Linkletter did not become generally
applicable until the Court's decision in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The Court
said: "The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicates (a) the purpose to be served
by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the
old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application
of the new standards." 388 U.S. at 297. See Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A
Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1566 (1975).
211. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
212. For examples of other retroactivity rules dealing with cases exempt from the doctrine of either Linkletter or Chevron, see supra note 203 and accompanying text.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:35

stand for the proposition that lower courts cannot rely on an automatic rule of retroactivity in many areas of criminal and civil law.
This principle has been modified and sharpened over time, 1 3 but
the fundamental holding of these cases has remained intact.
The application of Linkletter and Chevron by the lower courts
has been quite another matter. Despite the apparent diligence of
the lower courts in trying to follow the meandering paths of Linkletter, Chevron, and their progeny, they have been unable to apply
the new doctrines consistently. Almost every feature of the threepronged approach has been a source of uncertainty and confusion.
For example, under Linkletter some lower courts have exhibited
uncertainty concerning how far a decision must depart from established precedent before it is "new" enough to be restricted to prospective application.2 14 For reasons not related directly to retroactivity, the Supreme Court left the matter unsettled, at least in
cases raising fourth amendment considerations, for a substantial
period.2 1 5 The lower courts also have struggled in deciding which of
the three Linkletter and Chevron factors is most important,1 6
whether the courts may look to the substantive law altered by the
new rule when determining the new rule's purpose, 1 and the requirements for a sufficient claim of good faith reliance on the old
law.218 Additionally, for several years many courts mistakenly believed that Linkletter and Chevron did not enunciate distinct rules
for criminal and civil litigation.2 19 In fact, perhaps only the third
prong of the Linkletter and Chevron approach, which requires the
courts to use their sense of fairness when deciding whether retroactivity should apply, 22 ° has achieved substantially uniform and consistent lower court application.

213. See Corr, supra note 2, at 748-63.
214. See id. at 763-66.
215. See id. at 792-95.
216. See id. at 766-69.
217. See id. at 769-72.
218. See id. at 773-79.
219. See id. at 781-84.
220. See id. at 779-81.
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V. COMPARING NONMUTUALITY AND RETROACTIVITY

A. Basic Points in Common
The doctrine of nonmutuality appears to have enjoyed substan-•
tially more success in application than the doctrine of retroactivity.2 21 This discrepancy suggests that the doctrines may not share
certain characteristics equally. Those differences must be identified. At the same time, however, two characteristics common to
both nonmutual collateral estoppel and retroactivity should be acknowledged. First, both doctrines were inspired by a desire to promote more efficient and just results. 222 The two doctrines may allow different measures of discretion, 22 3 but in both the Supreme
Court apparently sacrificed some of the certainty associated with
the older hard-and-fast rules in favor of more just and flexible analytical techniques.2 2 4 Second, both doctrines are characterized by
the avidity with which lower courts have sought to follow even the
most minor twists in Supreme Court pronouncements.2 2 5 These
traits have significant consequences for the manner in which doctrine is applied. Together with the relevant differences between the
doctrines, they help explain how doctrine can be formulated to
achieve maximum success in operation.
B. Relative Novelty of the Doctrines
Some disruption in application accompanies virtually every doctrinal change, and the more abrupt the change the greater the resultant disruption because the courts are less confident when
treading new judicial ground. Linkletter represented a very abrupt
doctrinal change, but the Supreme Court decided that case six
years before it introduced nonmutual collateral estoppel in

221. Compare supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text (describing lower court application of nonmutuality) with supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text (describing lower
court application of retroactivity).
222. See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328-29 (purpose behind nonmutual collateral estoppel is fairness to parties and efficiency in judicial administration); Stovall v. Denno, 338
U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (reliance of parties and effect of retroactivity on administration of jus-

tice to be considered in new doctrine).
223. See infra notes 240-56 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 19, 29, 208 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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Blonder-Tongue, making retroactivity the older federal doctrine
from a purely chronological perspective. The lower courts have had
the considerable advantage of extra time in developing and applying the retroactivity doctrine compared to the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel.
From another perspective, however, nonmutual collateral estoppel is the "older" doctrine by a substantial margin. The Supreme
Court abandoned the mutuality requirement in Blonder-Tongue
thirty years after Justice Traynor's celebrated opinion adopting
nonmutuality in California.2 The Supreme Court had the benefit
of decades of state experience with nonmutuality when it built the
federal doctrine.227 With retroactivity, by contrast, the Court was
writing on a nearly clean slate. A scattering of precedent existed
for the proposition that elementary justice occasionally required
nonretroactive application of a new judicial rule228 but, unlike
nonmutuality, the real impetus for a change in retroactivity doctrine did not come from a measured evaluation of a pre-existing
analysis slowly maturing with time. Instead, Linkletter arose from
the need to face quickly the administrative and social consequences that would follow from suddenly applying the exclusionary
rule to "hundreds" of pre-Mapp unlawful searches and seizures.229
C. Relative Rate of Change in the Doctrines
When the Supreme Court develops a new and complex doctrine,
the first word on the doctrine inevitably will not be the last. Crafting a doctrine is not easy. A cautious approach like the Court's

226. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942). As the Supreme Court noted, the origin of nonmutual collateral estoppel in American Courts even predated Bernhard. See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 322-23.
227. See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 324 ("Many state and federal courts rejected the
mutuality requirement [after Bernhard], especially where the prior judgment was invoked
defensively.").
228. For a listing of a few earlier state cases in which courts made their law-changing
decisions automatically nonretroactive, see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective
Overruling, 109 U. P&. L. REv. 1, 8 (1960).
229. As the Supreme Court noted in Linkletter, retroactive application of Mapp might
have produced the release of literally "hundreds" of guilty persons. 381 U.S. at 637. Nowhere in Linkletter did the Court refer to the gradual development of retroactivity doctrine
which characterized the development of nonmutuality in collateral estoppel in the years
before Blonder-Tongue.
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decision in Blonder-Tongue230 may reduce most effectively the
backtracking and amending that often occurs in other cases testing
and expanding the doctrine. An excess of caution, of course, could
cast the lower courts adrift by forcing them to apply an overly circumscribed pronouncement to varied fact patterns. The Court
should follow a narrow line between overly bold pronouncements
that mislead and diffidence that fails to guide. Because all possible
fact patterns cannot be foreseen, even the best doctrinal work will
require some adjustment. In nonmutual collateral estoppel, for example, the Court has adjusted the broad grant of discretion in
Blonder-Tongue and Parklane for situations in which nonmutual
collateral estoppel is asserted against the government.23 1
Alterations to retroactivity doctrine since Linkletter have been
considerably more pronounced. For example, the Court may not
have intended Linkletter to represent an exhaustive list of the criteria relevant to retroactivity analysis, but subsequent cases established quickly that when Linkletter's three factors are applicable,
no other factors should be considered. 3 2 Moreover, the Supreme
Court used Chevron and a later decision23 3 to negate any suggestion implicit in Linkletter that distinctions should not be made
between criminal and civil cases.23 4 Another retroactivity decision
also reduced the scope of Linkletter by making the three-factor
approach inapplicable to matters affecting jurisdiction or rules of
criminal procedure that constitute entirely new law.23 5 Additionally, the Supreme Court hinted in another case that Linkletter is

230. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
232. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
233. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 563 (1982) ("all questions of civil retroactivity continue to be governed by the standard enunciated in Chevron"); see also id. at 550
n.12 (citing the test for civil retroactivity established in Chevron).
234. In Linkletter, the Court did not say directly that civil and criminal cases would be
subject to the identical retroactivity analysis, but it seemed to suggest the use of the same
approach. See 381 U.S. at 627-29.
235. See Corr, supra note 2, at 754-56, 760-71, 790-92 (jurisdictional questions); id. at
753, 759 (new rules of criminal procedure).
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not applicable to retroactivity issues affecting tax law.2 3 6 The number of alterations to the original Linkletter doctrine is striking, especially when compared to the relative stability of the doctrine of
nonmutual collateral estoppel.
D. Relative Importance of the Doctrines
Related closely to the relative novelty of the Supreme Court's
retroactivity and nonmutual collateral estoppel doctrines is the
magnitude of change each doctrine represents. The new approach
to retroactivity was significant not only in the degree of change it
represented, but also in the number of cases to which it applied.
Although some older retroactivity doctrines, applicable to relatively narrow fact patterns, remained in place even in the heyday
of Linkletter and Chevron,2 3 7 the single most important approach
to retroactivity after Linkletter was the three-part analysis the Supreme Court applied to virtually all civil and criminal litigation.23 8
By contrast, the new nonmutual collateral estoppel doctrine appears to have affected a substantially lower percentage of res judicata and collateral estoppel cases. In fact, the unfolding doctrine of
Blonder-Tongue, Parklane and Mendoza did not affect directly
the great majority of res judicata and collateral estoppel decisions
23 9
arising in the federal courts.
236. See id. at 758.
237. Perhaps the two most important exceptions to the general applicability of either
Linkletter or Chevron are civil cases in which the change in law occurred while the case was
pending on direct appeal and cases in which the federal court was sitting in diversity. See
Corr, supra note 2, at 756-57, 762, 784-85.
238. Of the more than two hundred cases examined in preparing the study of retroactivity, the overwhelming majority addressed retroactivity issues in circumstances other than
those involving changes in law while a case was pending on direct appeal. Cases based on
diversity jurisdiction were not researched as thoroughly as federal question cases, but diversity cases still seemed to comprise much less than a majority of the litigation in which questions of retroactivity arose. See Corr, supra note 2.
239. The collection of res judicata and collateral estoppel decisions gathered for this Article was not exhaustive, but of the roughly eighty-five circuit decisions examined, nearly twothirds addressed other areas of finality doctrine and had nothing to do with nonmutual
collateral estoppel. Moreover, in the remaining one-third, the nonmutual collateral estoppel
issue was sometimes less important than other finality issues. The Supreme Court addressed
areas of finality doctrine unrelated to nonmutual collateral estoppel in roughly two-thirds of
its finality doctrine cases. Those ratios change, of course, when cases are counted in which
res judicata and collateral estoppel were related so closely that they were not treated as
distinct doctrines. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982)
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This disparity may produce disadvantages in both cases, but the
problems associated with the large, abrupt change in the retroactivity doctrine may produce particular problems. Linkletter and
Chevron "crowded out" more established doctrine than BlonderTongue and Mendoza. As a result, more cases are available to help
refine the doctrine, but the courts have had to apply retroactivity
analysis without recourse to undisturbed, analogous rules. Whether
the application of retroactivity doctrine has suffered from this phenomenon or whether nonmutual collateral estoppel has benefitted
by its status as a corollary of larger doctrines is not clear. Few
judges or lawyers, however, would want to forego the advantage of
readily available analogy.
E. Comparing Discretion in the Doctrines
The new doctrines of nonmutual collateral estoppel and retroactivity both represent an abandonment of prior rules that afforded
courts little discretion in favor of more flexible, fact-oriented approaches designed to achieve more just results by vesting the lower
courts with considerable discretion.2 4 0 In the case of nonmutual
collateral estoppel, the court abandoned mutuality.2 1 Before the
change, if a court determined that mutuality did not exist its work
was done. The absence of identical parties, and the resulting lack
of mutually binding obligations arising from the prior judgment,
prevented estoppel from operating in the second action. The mutuality principle was subject to the longstanding qualification that
privity between the parties to the two actions also might satisfy
the mutuality requirement. The circumstances under which a court
could make an additional determination concerning privity did not
extend materially a court's discretion. Courts merely applied an
additional body of largely non-discretionary rules to address the

("[T]his Court has consistently emphasized the importance of the related doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel in fulfilling the purpose for which civil courts had been [sic]
established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdiction."). Even disregarding res judicata cases, however, nonmutual collateral estoppel decisions in both the Su-

preme Court and the circuits make up a smaller percentage of all collateral estoppel decisions than the percentage of all retroactivity decisions that can be categorized exclusively
under Linkletter or Chevron.
240. See supra notes 19, 29, 208, 224 and accompanying text.

241. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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privity issue and then completed their application of mutual collateral estoppel.2 4 2
With respect to judicial discretion, the difference between mutuality and the new nonmutual approach hardly could be more striking. Mutuality dictated a hard-and-fast determination, with little
discretion, but the Supreme Court's approach to nonmutual collateral estoppel established a test of general fairness and vested a
maximum amount of discretion in the lower courts. As Justice
White remarked in Blonder-Tongue, "no one set of facts, no one
collection of words or phrases, will provide an automatic formula
for proper rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end, [the] decision will
2 43
necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity.
Justice Stewart echoed this sentiment in Parklane."We have concluded," he said, "that the preferable approach for dealing with
these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of
grant trial courts broad discreoffensive collateral estoppel, but2to
44
tion when it should be applied.
The Court has retreated from this broad grant of discretion only
once, but that retreat is significant. In Mendoza, the Supreme
Court reimposed the mutuality requirement for most cases in
which a party invokes collateral estoppel against the government.2 45 In general, the reimposition of mutuality on efforts to estop the government collaterally represents an abandonment of discretion in cases to which Mendoza applies.
In the area of retroactivity, some authority prior to Linkletter
indicated that retroactive application of changes in law was neither
automatic nor non-discretionary. 246 In the bulk of pre-Linkletter
opinions, however, courts held that their function was limited simply to applying the new law.24 7 Compared to this mechanistic approach, Linkletter afforded a great deal of discretion:
242. For a further discussion of issues of privity, see supra note 98 and cases cited
therein.
243. 402 U.S. at 333-34.
244. 439 U.S. at 331.
245. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
246. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
247. See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (an unconstitutional statute
"in legal contemplation, [is] as inoperative as though it had never been passed"); United
States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (appellate courts should apply
the law as it presently exists, not as it once was). In Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
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[T]he effect of [a change in law] on prior final judgments when
collaterally attacked is subject to no set "principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity" but depends upon a consideration of
"particular relations .. .and particular conduct . . of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality"; and "of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application.".
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to
apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively,
we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each case.24 8
Current doctrine in both nonmutual collateral estoppel and retroactivity, therefore, clearly affords more discretion than previously was available. The degree of discretion available to the lower
courts, however, is not the same for both doctrines. A comparison
of the rules governing nonmutual collateral estoppel and retroactivity demonstrates that the amount of discretion given to courts
considering retroactivity is significantly lower than for nonmutuality. In Blonder-Tongue, the Court clarified not only that no hardand-fast rule would apply, but also that no established body of criteria would govern every case.2 49 Parklane added a special consideration for cases involving offensive collateral estoppel, prohibiting
its use "where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the first action." 250 This apparent restriction of trial court discretion may be
vitiated, however, by the Court's acknowledgment in the same passage that other unarticulated reasons could determine the outcome
of a lower court's use of discretion.2 51 In short, the Court intended
the grant of discretion in nonmutual collateral estoppel analysis to

State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), Chief Justice Hughes said that Norton "must be taken
with qualifications," id. at 374, but nothing even that tepid ever has been attached to the
rule in Schooner Peggy concerning civil cases pending on direct appeal. See supra note 203
and accompanying text.
248. 381 U.S. at 627, 629 (quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371, 374); see also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-27 (1966) ("in criminal
matters, the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective ... where the
exigencies of the situation require such an application").
249. 402 U.S. at 333-34.
250. 439 U.S. at 331.
251. Id.
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be virtually absolute, governed only by the broad concept of fairness to the parties, and apparently tested only by the standard of
abuse of discretion.
Although Linkletter clearly afforded more latitude than older
retroactivity doctrine," 2 it also provided less discretion than is
available to courts deciding nonmutuality cases. The new rule
quickly evolved into limited discretion because the three considerations identified in Linkletter became essentially the only factors
which lower courts could consider. The Supreme Court's language
in Stovall v. Denno,2 55 one of the more important early decisions in
the Linkletter line, 54 demonstrated the manner in which the High
Court circumscribed lower court discretion in applying retroactivity doctrine. According to the Court in Stovall, "The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicates (a) the purpose to be
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on
the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards. ' 25 5 In contrast to Parklane,the Court in Stovall did not
suggest that lower courts could consider other factors peculiar to a
particular case. 256

252. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
253. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
254. See supra note 210.
255. 388 U.S. at 297.
256. Somewhat weaker evidence also suggests that lower courts have greater discretion
with nonmutuality than with retroactivity. In both Blonder-Tongue and Parklane,the Supreme Court emphasized that "trial courts," defined as tribunals operating well below the
level of the High Court, were the institutions to whom a broad grant of discretion had been
made. See supra notes 19, 29 and accompanying text. In matters of retroactivity, however,
the Court's literal language suggested that only the High Court enjoyed discretion. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965) ("the [Supreme] Court may in the interest of justice
make the rule prospective"). In the early years of the Linkletter doctrine, the Court may
not have realized fully that retroactivity would be more than just an occasional decision, but
rather a doctrine with which all federal courts would have to grapple. Until the Court recognized the magnitude of the retroactivity problems it had unearthed with Linkletter, it may
have believed that lower court discretion was unnecessary. Later, when the Court recognized
that retroactivity would be a recurring question in the lower courts, its only adjustment was
to extend to them the authority to use the three factors of Linkletter.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. The Role of Novelty in Judicial Doctrine
One point which the comparison of nonmutual collateral estoppel and retroactivity makes clear is that a new doctrine based on
limited judicial experience, such as retroactivity,2 57 is more difficult
to apply. This conclusion is not startling, but the axiom that shiny
new doctrine takes longer to develop and flesh out than a less dramatically changed doctrine conceals another truth: in applying judicial doctrine, novelty itself can impose substantial costs.
When the Supreme Court changes doctrine to achieve more just
and efficient results, others often debate whether the desired results are in fact better or even attainable. Few, however, question
the Supreme Court's willingness to attempt doctrinal improvement. Unquestionably, the Court should be willing to change rules
when justice requires a change, but the Court also should consider
the hidden costs of lower court confusion and uncertainty which
change imposes. If the Supreme Court painstakingly crafts the new
doctrine and successfully avoids unforeseeable complications, perhaps these costs can be minimized. Even so, the transition period
and the associated costs can be significant. 58
Because some cost is inevitable, the Court should consider the
magnitude of the short-term loss in justice and efficiency that may
occur while lower courts are adapting to a new doctrine, especially
when the Court does not anticipate substantial long-term gains in
justice and efficiency. Although no mechanical cost/benefit calculation has been established, the courts' experience with collateral estoppel and retroactivity suggests that the Supreme Court should
consider: (1) the lower courts' experience with analogous doctrines;
(2) the lower courts' access to the experience of other jurisdictions,
particularly state courts, with identical or similar doctrines; (3) the
problems interested parties may have in predicting how the lower
courts will adapt to a new rule; and (4) the importance of the need

257. See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Corr, supra note 2, at 766-79, 781-84, 790-92 (documenting continuing confusion in the lower courts between 1972 and 1982 concerning various aspects of the new
retroactivity doctrine).
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for rapid change.259 When the first three considerations are unfavorable, the Supreme Court should consider whether a doctrinal
change is really appropriate.2 60
B. Complexity as it Affects the Quality of Judicial Doctrine
The perceived complexity of a particular doctrine is proportional
to its novelty. Doctrines that initially appear fiendishly difficult
may become more manageable as they become more familiar. Even
so, complexity has a component distinct from novelty because, regardless of the opportunity to examine different mechanisms, some
doctrines are more intricate than others by their very nature.
To afford the prospect of justice to all members of a complex
society, good doctrines often must be complex; yet complexity can
impede the development and application of these doctrines. Excessively complex doctrines may be too difficult for courts and parties
to understand, effectively precluding just application. Moreover, a
comprehensible doctrine still may be so intricate in application

259. The Supreme Court normally has measured benefits in terms of increased efficiency
in the judicial system and more just results. See, e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text.
260. Cynics and judicial conservatives might say that admonishing the Court about the
dangers of novelty may be like warning an alcoholic not to drink too much liquor. The
principle may be understood readily in the abstract, but those who should heed the warning
often will be the least able to decide when it should be applied. In any event, sometimes the
Supreme Court rightly feels compelled to consider altering a doctrine notwithstanding the
risks that sudden and substantial change entails. Linkletter, which concerned the consequences of Mapp v. Ohio, arguably presented such a circumstance. See supra notes 204-10.
For that matter, Mapp itself reasonably can be defended as a necessary change because
substantial analogies clearly existed given the prior federal experience with the exclusionary
rule.
Just as importantly, diffidence in deciding to fashion a new doctrine should not be
equated with trepidation in following a chosen course. The Supreme Court's circumspection
about whether Blonder-Tongue was a wholesale abandonment of mutuality or was applicable merely to patent cases, see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text, did no good, and
even may have done some harm. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. The
Court's self-serving post-Blonder-Tongue representation that mutuality really had been
abandoned in 1971 did not rectify that harm. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
The same reluctance to come to grips with doctrine also surfaced with retroactivity. See
Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 200 n.10 (1982) (Supreme Court "frequently" has
applied tax decisions retroactively).
In short, caution in making a decision to change a doctrine is understandable and appropriate, but once the Court introduces a new doctrine it should explain that doctrine fully, to
provide the lower courts with adequate guidance. Caution in areas of manifest uncertainty
may be reasonable, but Delphic pronouncements offering no standard create confusion.
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that even those who grasp the doctrine's abstractions cannot apply
it well. The Supreme Court's task, then, is to introduce as much
complexity as necessary to make a doctrine theoretically just without making it either incomprehensible or too intricate for practical
application.8 1
In the areas of nonmutual collateral estoppel and retroactivity,
the Court successfully has avoided complexity severe enough to
prevent understanding. Perhaps the most dispositive evidence of
this success is the law review commentary on these subjects. Usually, law review commentators are not the Court's most diffident
critics, but in these areas they have focused their remarks on the
perceived fairness of the new rules and have not raised questions
about the intelligibility of either doctrine. 2 This approval by silence is good news for these doctrines, but it also means that an
examination of nonmutual collateral estoppel and retroactivity offers little instruction concerning how to develop comprehensible
doctrines. The loss may not be great, however, because the courts
inevitably will discover unintelligible doctrines quickly, and they
can alter those doctrines before they have caused significant
damage.
When excessive complexity affects only a doctrine's application
and not its intelligiblity, the damage may be more severe. Typically, much time will pass before anyone realizes that the lower
courts' confusion is not merely a product of the doctrine's novelty.
By that time, even assuming the excessive complexity is readily
correctable and the court acts promptly, considerable harm may

261. See Schauer, Categories and the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 265, 305-07 (1981) (free speech doctrines must be "learnable" by those who must
apply them). Although Professor Schauer remarks that "codes must in fact be applied to
new situations by persons other than the ones who create or promulgate the code," id. at
305, his comments assume that a doctrine which is "learnable" also will be applicable.
Schauer, therefore, does not consider the related problem of possible difficulties in applying
doctrine even when it is comprehensible.
262. See, e.g., Shapiro and Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REV. 442 (1971) (not unfair to invoke nonnutual collateral estoppel, even when it forecloses possibility of a jury trial); Schwartz, Retroactivity,
Reliability and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHL L. REv. 719 (1966)
(Linkletter unfair to criminal defendants).
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have resulted from misapplication of the doctrine. The circumstances that give rise to excessive complexity in application, therefore, must be uncovered and avoided.
Nonmutual collateral estoppel and retroactivity afford an opportunity to identify these circumstances because the Supreme Court
has had difficulty controlling the complexities that obstruct application by lower courts. This Article shows that the application of
the new nonmutual collateral estoppel doctrine has been smooth
and simple,26 3 while application of the retroactivity doctrine has
been a morass. 264 Apart from the difficulty produced by the number of retroactivity doctrines26 5 and the High Court's occasional
inconsistency in choosing among them,2 66 the sheer complexity of
Linkletter and Chevron has left lower courts floundering. For example, courts seem able to grasp intellectually their mandate to
consider the parties' reliance on existing law, but they have been
unable to identify any consistent standard for determining what
constitutes justifiable reliance.26 7 Many other examples exist. In
fact, most of the features of Linkletter and Chevron have caused
uncertainty,2 68 and neither the lower courts nor affected parties
can predict with confidence what most of the considerations mandated by these two cases will produce when applied.

263. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit recently demonstrated the ease with which the variety of retroactivity doctrines can confuse a court. In Nations v. Sun Oil Co., 705 F.2d 742 (5th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 239 (1983), a diversity action, the Fifth Circuit used the Chevron
factors of purpose, reliance and effect, see supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text, to
conclude that a particular change of law should be retroactive. 705 F.2d at 744. The result
was correct, but only by coincidence. The rule the Fifth Circuit should have used was that
of Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941), requiring automatic retroactivity in diversity cases. Chevron, by contrast, holds out at least the possibility of
prospectivity.
266. See Corr, supra note 2, at 790-92.
267. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., supra note 217 and accompanying text (uncertainty about how to apply the
"purpose" factor of Linkletter and Chevron); supra note 219 and accompanying text (uncertainty about whether Linkletter and Chevron establish different rules for criminal and civil
cases); and supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (uncertainty about whether Linkletter and Chevron incorporate a requirement that the rule in question must be in fact a new
rule).
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The third factor of Linkletter and Chevron, however, which may
be described as either "a consideration of the equities, or the effect
of retroactivity upon the administration of justice, ' ' 269 is a significant exception to the courts' confusion in the application of retroactivity doctrine. Characterized either way, the third factor represents an attempt to consider the basic fairness of retroactivity both
to private parties and to the society represented by the judicial
system. Fairness is not a complex concept to grasp, and its presence or absence may be noted readily. Not surprisingly, therefore,
the cases examined in the course of the investigation of retroactivity doctrine disclosed relatively few problems in applying this third
factor.1 0
A potentially useful correlation has begun to appear. The Supreme Court's freewheeling approach to nonmutual collateral estoppel, based on fairness to the parties, has enjoyed striking
success. 27 1 Similarly, the only identifiable kernel of success in retroactivity doctrine rests in the considerations of fairness found in
the third factor of Linkletter and Chevron.7 2 At the same time,
excessive complexity begins when the Supreme Court mandates a
case-by-case analysis, and establishes relatively inflexible techniques to be used in making that analysis. Of course, undue complexity cannot always be avoided and success achieved merely by
granting the lower courts unbridled discretion to follow their instincts of fairness. 273 A flat mandate simply to be fair is a mandate

269. See Corr, supra note 2, at 779. In Chevron, the Court focused on principles of equity,
while in Linkletter the Court discussed the issue in terms of administration of justice. Id. at
779 n.212.
270. Id. at 779-81.
271. See supra notes 190-93, 264 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.

273. Another way the Supreme Court can avoid the excessive complexity which can damage a doctrine's application is to grant no discretion at all to the lower federal courts. Such
an approach presents no problems related to complexity, but a general prohibition on the
use of discretion has its own substantial costs. Under the old non-discretionary requirement
of mutuality, for example, a great deal of court time and litigants' resources had to be expended relitigating matters previously decided. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying

text. Similarly, if the old doctrines of automatic retroactivity had been applied to the facts
of Linkletter,many convicted felons would have been released from prison, creating a manifest injustice to society at large. See supra note 229.

Such costs do not indicate necessarily that a denial of discretion is always bad. Often, a
firm rule is the best approach. For instance, in United States v. Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 568
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to judge by personal bias. Excessive complexity may be a problem,
but uncontrolled discretion is not the solution. 4
The proper conclusion to the dilemma posed by complexity is
that, when the Supreme Court identifies a need to abandon a rigid
rule in favor of a case-by-case analysis, it can achieve the best results by following through on its intention and granting the lower
courts substantial discretion. The High Court should guide that
discretion by articulating possible decisive considerations, but the
Court should hold the reins of supervision lightly. The experience
of lower courts with most current retroactivity doctrine testifies to
what can happen if the Court posits a case-by-case analysis and

(1984), the Court denied lower courts the authority to decide whether a public interest prevented application of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. Justice Rehnquist explained why the Supreme Court chose to bar application of nonmutual collateral
estoppel in most circumstances in which it was sought against the government instead of
allowing an assessment of public interest:
[W]e believe that the standard announced by the Court of Appeals for determining when relitigation of a legal issue is to be permitted [i.e., when the government is able to establish the presence of an important national interest] is
so wholly subjective that it affords no guidance to the courts or to the government. Such a standard leaves the government at sea because it cannot possibly
anticipate, in determining whether or not to appeal an adverse decision,
whether a court will bar relitigation of the issue in a later case.
Id. at 573; see also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (no
public policy exception in res judicata; "[s]imple justice is achieved when a complex body of
law developed over a period of years is evenhandedly applied").
These examples indicate that no single approach to the development of doctrine always
will be best. The best approach for a particular legal question, however, should recognize
and try to minimize problems such as the difficulty of application associated with a particular approach.
274. One remaining problem is rooted in the nagging fact that, notwithstanding the absence of a straitjacket controlling nonmutuality, courts applying the doctrine have hewn
closely to Supreme Court guidelines. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text. With
that in mind, one reasonably might ask whether greater discretion really helps explain why
nonmutuality has been applied more successfully than retroactivity. After all, how much
difference could discretion make if discretion goes unused?
A likely answer lies in the greater experience courts have had with nonmutuality. Forty
years after Justice Traynor first popularized a break with mutuality, courts probably already knew most of what they needed to know about the discretionary features of nonmutuality. In that sense, the suggested guidance the Supreme Court offered in Parklanewas no
straitjacket. Instead, it represented more than a generation's experience, including all the
likely permutations in which nonmutual collateral estoppel was likely to be found. The
lower courts' lack of deviation from that experience speaks to the wisdom of avoiding rapid
breaks with the past.
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then straitjackets the approach with factors binding lower court
discretion.
VII. EPmOGUE
The conclusions of this Article are drawn within the narrow
framework of two judicial doctrines as the federal courts recently
have developed and applied them. Because the base of information
on the operation of these doctrines in the lower courts is not yet
large enough to justify broad generalization, more sweeping statements about the relative wisdom of various doctrinal approaches
cannot be made. Such conclusions must await additional examinations of other judicial doctrines at work. Examination of doctrine
in the trenches, however, clearly produces a substantially different
view than that obtained from the mountaintops on which so much
analysis takes place. The study of doctrine as applied may require
different methodology than is used to study doctrine as declared.
It also may involve far more drudgery, but the potential for improving judicial doctrine seems to justify the effort. Doctrine can
be improved by studying more than just its appearance as it falls
from the lips of the High Court. The tools of improvement are
readily at hand.

